Courtesy of Jim Bowman about 500th Bomb Group:
On the night of 9-10 March 1945 the XXI Bomber Command carried out the first mass low-level fire raid against Japan.
Rumors had been swirling around the Command for some time about the crazy ideas their new commander, Maj Gen Curtis LeMay, seemed to have in his mind. So it was with a sense of foreboding that the crews filed into the briefing rooms on the morning of 9 March to get the scoop about their next mission. But even though they expected unpleasant news, they were still stunned by the successive hammerblows coming at them. The target was Tokyo, probably the best protected city in the country. They would bomb not only at low altitude, but very low altitude, as low as 5,000 feet for some units. There would be no formations -- every plane was on its own. And to top it off, no ammo would be carried! Most men left the briefing rooms that day convinced of two things: one, LeMay was indeed a maniac; and two, many of them would not live to see the next day. ...
But this plan was not the product of a deranged mind or the diktat of an egomaniac. Lemay was a methodical thinker who considered every possibility... and supposed impossibility. Everything had been carefully thought out over the past several weeks. Japanese AA had been determined to be least effective between 5,000 and 10,000 feet. It was known that the Japanese had few night fighters, and the ones they had were not very good. And in the darkness over Japan, any plane you might see -- and fire on -- was more likely to be another B-29 than a Jap plane, so going out unarmed was actually for the crews' own protection. Furthermore, every pound saved in weight of ammo, and by extension the then superfluous guns and gunners -- was another pound of bombs that could be carried.
But even if all this had been clinically explained to the crews, it probably wouldn't have made them feel any better. Abstract knowledge will not quell that bad feeling in your gut.
[A special request for those who were there. Obviously, not everyone reacted the same, but did I get the overall feelings of the crews right? Critical feedback, please. Thanks. - JEB]
The no ammo directive was perhaps most irking. Sure, your chances of meeting a Jap night fighter might be only one in fifty or a hundred, but if that one chance happens you want at least to be able to shoot back. So some crews made up their minds to "reinterpret" LeMay's orders. As Bill Royster, a tail gunner in the 499th Group, put it, "[We knew] all about LeMay's SUGGESTION that we fly without full crews and empty guns, but he wasn't going to go. We decided that it was optional." Royster's crew would take loaded guns along, and so would many others. Examination of numerous memoirs and reminiscences shows that reactions ran the gamut: some crews followed the orders and took no guns, some crews took only loaded tail guns, and others took all their guns, with ammo. Even LeMay's own after-action Report of Operations sent to Gen Arnold in Washington (inadvertently?) reveals that his orders re ammo were disobeyed: "No gunnery was employed against the enemy on this mission with the exception of approximately 500 rounds fired at some searchlights."
This mission was the first one for the 500th Bomb Group in which the planes, most of them anyway, took off without full crews. To take my father's crew (#224) of the 882nd Squadron as an example, they decided to take only two gunners, probably to serve as scanners at the side blisters. The other two gunners, including my father, stayed behind this time but switched with the first two gunners for the next mission, and so on for the next two fire missions after that. Records indicate many other crews followed the same procedure.
The 500th scheduled a record 42 aircraft for this mission, of which 41 were airborne. (The records do not show which plane was scratched.) Since there would be no formations, there were no designated squadron or group leaders, but three planes, Z-27 (LaMarche), Z-13 (Luman) and Z-42 (Moreland), were designated as lead aircraft. These three planes, loaded with 184 x M47A2 incendiary clusters (only 182 in the case of Z-13) with instantaneous nose fuses, would go in first to mark the target area for the remaining planes, each of which carried 40 x E28 incendiary clusters fused to open at 2,000 feet. Group CO, Lt Col John Dougherty, flew in the lead plane, Z-27, with Capt Austin W. LaMarche and crew.
The participating planes and (500th BG) crews were as follows:
Z-27 (LaMarche)
Z-13 (Luman)
Z-42 (Moreland), "Supine Sue"
Z-22 (D. Jackson), "Georgia Ann"
Z-19 (Althoff), "Sna Pe Fort"
Z-14 (Mather)
Z-12 (Curtis)
Z-11 (Calhoun)
Z-8 (Fitzgerald), "Mission to Albuquerque"
Z-6 (Booze), "Booze Hound"
Z-5 (Kappil), "There'll Always Be A Christmas"
Z-4 (Taylor), "Black Magic"
Z-2 (Lewis), "20th Century Limited"
Z-1 (Bricker)
Z-55 (Ryan), "Janice E."
Z-53 (Clinkscales), "The Ancient Mariner"
Z-52 (Irby), "20th Century Sweetheart"
Z-51 (Schmidt), "Tail Wind"
Z-50 (Braden), "Fancy Detail"
Z-49 (Gregg), "Three Feathers"
Z-48 (Black)
Z-47 (Adams), "Adam's Eve"
Z-41 (Barron), "The Baroness"
Z-30 (Reeves), "Sting Shift"
Z-35 (Gray), "Pacific Queen"
Z-34 (Farrell), "Frisco Nannie"
Z-33 (Hughes), "Slick Dick"
Z-32 (Parsons), "Fever from the South"
Z-28 (Haas), "Old Ironsides"
Z-24 (Sasser), "Pride of the Yankees"
Z-23 (Hays), "Ramblin Roscoe"
Z-29 (Shorey), "Gravel Gertie"
Z-3 (H. Jackson), "Ann Dee"
Z-10 (Thompson), "Punchin' Judy"
Z-9 (Conn), "Nina Ross"
Z-21 (Hanft), "Devils' Delight"
Z-43 (Setterich?)
Z-31 (Arbon?), "Homing De-Vice"
Z-26 (Sewell?)
Z-45 (McClanahan?), "Mustn't Touch"
Z-54 (Standen?)
[Crew assignments for these last five aircraft, all aborts, are uncertain. Any help appreciated. - JEB]
Take-off was from 1818 to 1853. The 500th Group was second in the Wing take-off order and was assigned altitudes of 3000-3500 feet to fly en route to the target.
Five aircraft aborted before reaching Japan. Z-43's #1 prop stuck at 2900 RPM immediately after take-off. Z-31 was only a short distance out when her #1 prop ran away and could not be feathered. Z-26 and Z-45 were likewise not far out when they ran into problems. The former had a back-firing #2 engine and excessive cylinder head temperature, while the latter could not fully close the front bomb bay doors and the #3 nacelle wheel well door. Finally, Z-54 was about two hours out when she lost her #2 engine. All five of these planes made it safely back to base.
Most of the remaining aircraft reached Japan as planned in the vicinity of the city of Katsuura, but a few had navigation and radar problems. Z-29, Z-10 and Z-9 had inoperative radars and were confused by some fires started by earlier errant bombings on Choshi Point, so they mistakenly dropped their bombs there. Another plane with a malfunctioning radar and poor navigation, Z-3, bombed Tateyama Hojo, well northeast of Tokyo, as a target of opportunity. Finally, Z-21, also with radar not working, became very lost and ended up bombing Sendai, nearly 200 miles northeast of Tokyo.
This left a total of 31 planes to reach the IP, which was a small peninsula southeast of Tokyo. The course to the target from here was 308 degrees, but there was really no need to look at the compass, as the glow from fires already started could be seen from many miles away.
On the way across Tokyo Bay, Z-13 was hit by flak at 7000 feet. Flak was much heavier over Tokyo, where Z-13 was struck again, along with eight more bombers -- Z-4, Z-14, Z-30, Z-41, Z-42, Z-50, Z-52 and Z-55. Fortunately, most of the damage was light and none was fatal. The Japanese used searchlights in an attempt to illuminate the B-29's for their anti-aircraft guns and night fighters, but the searchlights seemed erratic and were only able to catch a few planes in their beams, and generally for only a short time. As for night fighters, only nine attacks were reported, and none caused any damage.
Bomb drops were made individually from 0134 to 0251 and from between 6900 and 7800 feet. Ten aircraft suffered partial rack malfunctions and were unable to release all their bombs -- Z-13 (5), Z-27 (1), Z-42(1), Z-2 (6), Z-4 (5), Z-19 (1), Z-23 (15), Z-24 (6), Z-28 (1) and Z-51 (1) -- but the vast majority, over 500 M47 and over 1,000 E28 incendiaries, fell down to add to the inferno below.
Returning crews reported a huge conflagration over Tokyo. They also reported something they had not experienced before -- severe turbulence due to thermal updrafts, making it very difficult to maintain altitude and hold steady on the bomb run. Some planes had been pushed up to above 9000 feet. But all made it through safely.
Exit was to the right after bombs away, to the coast north of Choshi Point and then home. All planes returned safely on Saipan, landing between 0839 and 1137 on 10 March.
Post-strike photos showed the heart of Tokyo burned out, nearly 16 square miles. An estimated 83,000 Japanese died in the fires, more than would die in the atomic blast at Hiroshima. For the XXI Bomber Command this was the most successful attack to date, and LeMay already had plans to duplicate the results in other cities.
Jim Bowman
Courtesy of Hap Halloran of the 499th Bomb Group:
Feedback for JEB per his request re fireraid on Tokyo March 10.
I was not on the mission however as I was already a POW (since downed Jan 27th over Tokyo) in Kempei Tai adjacent Central
Tokyo. I was tied up in my solitary cage. As the flames were apparently moving in a Western direction my area of confinement was soon in the fire zone. I never thought I would survive that night. I was frightened and prayed thru the raid. It was the most frightening time of my Life.
Hap Halloran 499th - 73 rd saipan based.
Note: Many more Bomb Groups were in this raid including those who were trained at
Pratt Army Air Field.